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use#LAARELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, INCOMPLETE
CONTRACTS, AND THE PATTERN OF TRADE*
NATHAN NUNN
Is a country’s ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of com-
parative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that mea-
sures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require rela-
tionship-speciﬁc investments. Combining this measure with data on trade ﬂows
and judicial quality, I ﬁnd that countries with good contract enforcement special-
ize in the production of goods for which relationship-speciﬁc investments are most
important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the
pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I test whether a country’s ability to enforce
written contracts is an important determinant of comparative
advantage. The channel that I consider builds on the well-estab-
lished insight that when investments are relationship-speciﬁc,
under-investment occurs if contracts cannot be enforced [Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1979, 1985; Grossman
and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990]. Because countries with
better contract enforcement have less under-investment, they
will have a cost advantage in the production of goods requiring
relationship-speciﬁc investments.
I examine this hypothesis by testing whether countries with
better contract enforcement export relatively more in industries
for which relationship-speciﬁc investments are important. To
quantify the importance of relationship-speciﬁc investments, I
construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion
of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-speciﬁc in-
vestments. I use the United States input–output tables to deter-
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569mine which intermediate inputs are used and in what propor-
tions in the production of each ﬁnal good. Inputs requiring
relationship-speciﬁc investments are identiﬁed using data
from Rauch [1999] on whether an input is sold on an organized
exchange or not. If an input is sold on an exchange, then the
market for the input is thick, with many alternative buyers
and sellers. Because of this, the value of the input outside of a
buyer–seller relationship is close to the value inside the rela-
tionship, and by deﬁnition the input is not relationship-speciﬁc
[Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; Williamson 1979, 1985]. If
a good is not sold on an exchange, it may be reference priced in
trade publications. This indicates an intermediate level of mar-
ket thickness and relationship-speciﬁcity. Using this addi-
tional indicator, I construct a second measure that classiﬁes
inputs that are neither bought and sold on an exchange nor
reference priced as relationship-speciﬁc.
At the country level, I ﬁnd that the average contract intensity
of production and of exports is positively correlated with judicial
quality and contract enforcement. At the country-industry level, I
ﬁnd that countries with better contract enforcement export rela-
tively more in industries for which relationship-speciﬁc invest-
ments are most important. According to the estimates, contract
enforcement explains more of the global pattern of trade than
countries’ endowments of capital and skilled labor combined. To
correct for potential reverse causality from trade ﬂows to judicial
quality I exploit differences in countries’ legal origins, using both
instrumental variables (IVs) and propensity score matching tech-
niques. The estimated effect of judicial quality on trade ﬂows
continues to be signiﬁcant and remains approximately the same
magnitude as the OLS estimates.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reports
the estimating equation. Section III describes the data, explain-
ing in detail the construction of the measures of contract inten-
sity. Section IV reports the OLS estimates and Section V tackles
the issue of endogeneity. Section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND ESTIMATING EQUATION
The importance of contract enforcement and relationship-
speciﬁc investments in international trade has been well de-
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1 While the initial focus has been on modelling the
effect that contract enforcement has on the decisions of multi-
national ﬁrms [McLaren 2000; Grossman and Helpman 2002,
2003, 2005; Antra `s 2003; Antra `s and Helpman 2004; Ornelas
and Turner 2005; Puga and Treﬂer 2005], more recent studies
also consider the effect that contract enforcement can have on
comparative advantage [Levchenko 2004; Antra `s 2005; Acemo-
glu, Antra `s, and Helpman 2005; Costinot 2005].
2
To see exactly how contract enforcement can affect compar-
ative advantage, consider investments made by an input supplier
to customize an input for the needs of a ﬁnal good producer. These
investments are relationship-speciﬁc because the value of the
investments in customization are higher within the buyer-seller
relationship than outside the relationship. In this environment, if
contracts are imperfectly enforced ex post, then there is under-
investment ex ante [Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 1978; William-
son 1979, 1985; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990].
This under-investment is a potential source of comparative ad-
vantage. Because countries with good contract enforcement have
less under-investment, the costs of producing customized inputs,
as well as the ﬁnal goods using them, are lower. This cost advan-
tage will be greater the more important relationship-speciﬁc in-
puts are in the production of a ﬁnal good. From this it follows that
countries with better contract enforcement have a comparative
advantage in the production of ﬁnal goods that use intensively
inputs requiring relationship-speciﬁc investments.
I test this hypothesis by estimating the following equation:
(1) ln xic  i  c  1ziQc  2hiHc  3kiKc  εic,
where xic denotes total exports in industry i from country c to all
other countries in the world; zi is a measure of the importance of
relationship-speciﬁc investments (i.e., contract intensity) in in-
dustry i; Qc is a measure of the quality of contract enforcement in
country c; Hc and Kc denote country c’s endowments of skilled
labor and capital, and hi and ki are the skill and capital intensi-
ties of production in industry i; i and c denote industry ﬁxed
effects and country ﬁxed effects.
1. Surveys of this literature are provided by Spencer [2005], Treﬂer [2005],
and Helpman [2006].
2. Also see Head, Ries, and Spencer [2004] who ﬁnd evidence that, in the
production of auto parts, Japan’s keiretsu system promotes relationship-speciﬁc
investments, resulting in improved competitiveness relative to the United States.
571 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEIn this equation exports are explained by interactions of an
industry characteristic with a country characteristic. This func-
tional form was ﬁrst used by Rajan and Zingales [1998] to test
whether industrial sectors that are relatively more dependent on
external ﬁnancing develop faster in countries with better devel-
oped ﬁnancial markets. More recently, Romalis [2004] uses the
same speciﬁcation to test for the importance of countries’ factor
endowments as a source of comparative advantage. To see the
logic behind the interaction terms, consider the coefﬁcient 1 for
the judicial quality interaction term ziQc. A positive coefﬁcient
indicates that countries with better contract enforcement (i.e.,
high Qc countries) export relatively more in industries for which
relationship-speciﬁc investments are more important (i.e., high zi
industries). That is, countries with better contract enforcement
specialize in contract intensive industries. The same logic applies
to the factor endowment interactions hiHc and kiKc [see Romalis
2004]. If countries that are abundant in a factor specialize in
industries that use intensively that factor, then 2 and 3 will be
positive.
3
The estimation here is conceptually distinct from studies
that estimate a gravity model to show that there is a positive
relationship between a country’s total volume of trade and the
quality of its institutions or its ability to enforce contracts [e.g.,
Anderson and Marcouiller 2002; Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor
2006; de Groot et al. 2004; Ranjan and Lee 2004]. In my estimat-
ing equation the effect that contract enforcement Qc has on the
total volume of trade across all industries is captured by the
country ﬁxed effects. The coefﬁcient of interest 1 only captures
the effect that contract enforcement has on the pattern of trade,
not the total volume of trade.
Levchenko [2004], using an estimating equation similar to
(1), shows that countries with better institutions specialize in
goods that are institutionally dependent. As a proxy for institu-
tional intensity Levchenko uses a good’s complexity, measured by
the variety or range of inputs used in production. Like Levchenko,
3. Like Romalis [2004], I only consider positive exports. In doing this, the
question that I am considering is, conditional on a country exporting in an
industry, how do differences in the contracting environment affect the volume of
exports in that industry? The effect that a country’s contracting environment has
on its decision to enter an industry is not captured in my estimates. The data do
indicate that countries with better contract enforcement are more likely to export
in high contract intensive industries than low contract intensive industries.
However, I do not pursue this result in this paper.
572 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSI am also interested in the effect of institutions on trade, but my
focus is more narrow. I am interested in the effect of one speciﬁc
institution: contract enforcement. Further, I am interested in
only one channel through which contract enforcement affects the
pattern of trade: through under-investment in relationship-spe-
ciﬁc investments. While the previous empirical literature identi-
ﬁes the broader effects of institutions on trade ﬂows and on the
pattern of trade, I attempt to isolate a speciﬁc channel through
which contract enforcement affects comparative advantage.
For a number of reasons, one cannot take the estimates of (1)
as conclusive evidence of the effect of contract enforcement on the
pattern of trade. The ﬁrst reason is that there may be determi-
nants of comparative advantage that are omitted from (1). As-
sume that the true model includes the additional term wiWc.I fzi
and wi or Qc and Wc are correlated, then OLS estimates of 1 will
be biased. As shown below, contract intensive industries also tend
to be skill intensive. As well, countries with good judicial systems
also tend to have high incomes and be abundant in skilled labor.
Therefore, a primary concern is that ziQc may be simply captur-
ing the fact that developed countries tend to specialize in the
production of skill intensive, high-tech industries. Because of
this, in my estimation I carefully control for a host of alternative
determinants of comparative advantage.
The second reason to be cautious about the estimates of (1) is
that causality may run from comparative advantage to judicial
quality. Although, it has been shown that total trade volumes can
affect the development of political, economic, and legal institu-
tions [Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Lo ´pez-Co ´rdova
and Meissner 2005], less well studied is whether comparative
advantage can also affect institutions. One of the only sources of
evidence on this comes from Do and Levchenko [2006], who show
that comparative advantage affects ﬁnancial development. This
is because a country’s specialization of production affects its
demand for external ﬁnancing, which, in turn, affects subsequent
ﬁnancial development. The same logic also applies to contract
enforcement. Countries that specialize in contract intensive in-
dustries may have a greater incentive to develop and maintain a
good contracting environment. As a result, estimates of 1 may
also capture the feedback from specialization to judicial quality. I
deal with this issue explicitly in Section V, where I use legal
origin to isolate variation in judicial quality that is unaffected by
comparative advantage in 1997.
573 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEBefore moving to the estimation results, I ﬁrst describe the
data that I use, explaining in detail the construction of the mea-
sure of contract intensity across industries.
III. THE DATA
Data on trade ﬂows, factor endowments, and factor intensi-
ties of production are from standard sources. Industry level data
on trade ﬂows are from Feenstra [2000]. I convert the original
trade data which are classiﬁed by 4-digit SITC codes to the BEA’s
1997 I-O industry classiﬁcation. The ﬁnal data are classiﬁed into
222 industries that include both manufacturing and nonmanu-
facturing industries.
4 Data on countries’ stocks of human capital
and physical capital are from Antweiler and Treﬂer [2002]. Hu-
man capital stock is measured by the natural log of the ratio of
workers completing high school to those not completing high
school. Capital stock is the natural log of the average capital stock
per worker. Both measures are from 1992.
5 Data on the skill and
capital intensities of production are from Bartelsman and Gray
[1996]. Because data on factor intensities are only available for
manufacturing industries, when factor endowment interactions
are included in the estimating equation the number of industries
falls from 222 to 182.
As my primary measure of judicial quality Qc I use the “rule of
law” from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2003]. This is a
weighted average of a number of variables that measure individuals’
perceptions of the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary
and the enforcement of contracts in each country between 1997 and
1998. I also test the sensitivity of my results to the use of alternative
measures of judicial quality and contract enforcement taken from
Gwartney and Lawson [2003] and World Bank [2004]. As I show in
Section IV.C., the results of the paper are completely robust to the
use of these other measures. I have chosen to use Kaufmann et al.’s
variable as my baseline measure because it is available for the
largest number of countries. Of the 159 countries with trade data,
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2003] have data for 146 of them,
4. Details of the conversion are provided in the Appendix.
5. An alternative source of data on factor endowments is Hall and Jones
[1999]. I choose to use data from Antweiler and Treﬂer because the Hall and Jones
data on human and physical capital stocks are from 1985 and 1988. The estimates
are similar if the Hall and Jones data are used, except that the factor endowment
interactions are less signiﬁcant. The estimated coefﬁcients for the judicial quality
interaction are essentially identical.
574 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSwhile Gwartney and Lawson [2003] and World Bank [2004] have
data only for 112 and 116 of them.
III.A. Constructing Measures of Contract Intensity
The ﬁnal variable needed to estimate (1) is the importance of
relationship-speciﬁc investments across industries. To construct
this measure I ﬁrst use the 1997 United States I-O Use Table to
identify which intermediate inputs are used, and in what propor-
tions, in the production of each ﬁnal good.
6 Using data from
Rauch [1999], I identify which inputs require relationship-speciﬁc
investments. As an indicator of whether the investments needed
to produce an intermediate input are relationship-speciﬁc, I use
whether or not the input is sold on an organized exchange and
whether or not it is reference priced in a trade publication. If an
input is sold on an organized exchange then the market for this
input is thick, and the scope for hold-up is limited. If a buyer
attempts to renegotiate a lower price, then the seller can simply
take the input and sell it to another buyer.
7 If an input is not sold
on an exchange, it may be reference priced in trade publications,
which are purchased by potential buyers and sellers of the input.
Trade publications are only produced if there is a sufﬁcient num-
ber of purchasers of the publication. Therefore, if an input is
reference priced in a publication, then this indicates that there
exists a reasonably large number of potential buyers and sellers
of the input. Inputs not sold on an exchange but referenced in
trade publications can be thought of as having an intermediate
level of relationship-speciﬁcity.
Rauch’s original classiﬁcation groups goods into 1,189 indus-
tries classiﬁed according to the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system.
8 Each
industry is coded as being in one of the following three categories:
6. Because highly disaggregated I-O tables only exist for a few countries, I
must assume that every country’s intermediate input use is the same as the
United States’. I have checked the sensitivity of my results to this assumption
using more aggregate I-O tables (with 57 industries) from the Global Trade
Analysis Project (GTAP) Data Base. I obtain similar results if I restrict my sample
to only include countries with I-O tables that are most similar to the U.S. I-O
table. For details of this procedure, see Nunn [2005].
7. The setting that I describe is one where the seller must make relationship-
speciﬁc investments. However, in many situations it is the buyer who must make
relationship-speciﬁc investments. In this case, whether or not an input is bought and
sold on an exchange is still a good indicator of the relationship-speciﬁcity of the input.
This is because inputs bought and sold on an exchange also have many alternative
sellers, and, therefore, the seller’s ability to hold up the buyer is limited.
8. Rauch has both a liberal estimate and a conservative estimate. Through-
out the paper, I use the liberal estimate. None of the results of the paper are
affected by this decision.
575 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEsold on an exchange, reference priced, or neither. I aggregate the
Rauch data into 342 industries classiﬁed according to the BEA’s
I-O industry classiﬁcation. To match each SITC industry to an
I-O industry, I construct a concordance using the 4-digit SITC to
the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS10) concordance from Feen-
stra [1996] and the HS10 to I-O classiﬁcation concordance from
the BEA. Equal weights are used when aggregating the SITC
industries to the I-O classiﬁcation. In the end, I have data on the
fraction of each input that is sold on an organized exchange,
reference priced, and neither. Using this information, along with
information from the U.S. I-O Use Table on input use, I construct
for each ﬁnal good two measures of the proportion of its interme-
diate inputs that are relationship-speciﬁc:
zi
rs1 
j
ijRj
neither
zi
rs2 
j
ijRj
neither  Rj
ref price
ij  uij/ui, where uij is the value of input j used in industry i
and ui is the total value of all inputs used in industry i; Rj
neither is the
proportion of input j that is neither sold on an organized exchange
nor reference priced; and Rj
ref price is the proportion of input j that
is not sold on an organized exchange but is reference priced. I
denote the two measures of zi by rs1 and rs2, where rs stands for
“relationship-speciﬁc.” Both measures classify inputs that are
neither bought and sold on an exchange nor reference priced as
being relationship-speciﬁc, but the second measure also includes
reference priced inputs as being relationship-speciﬁc.
My use of Rauch’s classiﬁcation is quite different from that of
other studies. Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor [2006] and Ranjan
and Lee [2004] use Rauch’s data and show that the effect of
institutional quality on the volume of trade is greatest for goods
that are not sold on an organized exchange. The interpretation is
that goods not sold on an exchange are more complex and there-
fore institutions are a more important determinant of the volume
of trade for these goods. Unlike these studies, I do not use the
measure to classify the complexity of downstream ﬁnal goods, but
to identify the market thickness of upstream intermediate inputs.
A list of the twenty least and twenty most contract intensive
industries using zi
rs1 is provided in Table II. The ranking of
industries appears sensible. The least contract intensive indus-
576 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStries tend to have primary inputs that are not customized and are
bought and sold on thick markets: poultry processing, ﬂour mill-
ing, petroleum reﬁneries, corn milling, oilseed processing, etc.
The industries listed as the most contract intensive also seem
sensible. The industries are for various automobile, aircraft, com-
puter, and electronic equipment manufacturing industries, all of
which intensively use inputs requiring relationship-speciﬁc in-
vestments [Monteverde and Teece 1982; Masten, Meehan, and
Snyder 1989; Masten 1984].
Table I reports the correlations between the two measures of
contract intensity (zi
rs1 and zi
rs2) and factor intensities of produc-
tion (hi and ki). As shown, the two measures of contract intensity
are highly correlated with one another. In addition, the measures
of contract intensity are also correlated with skill and capital
intensity. Contract intensive industries tend to be skill intensive,
but not capital intensive.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
IV.A. Examining the Raw Data
Before turning to estimates of (1), I check whether there is
evidence in the raw data that contract enforcement is important
for comparative advantage. I do this by dividing countries into
good and poor judiciary countries, deﬁned as those with judicial
quality Qc above and below the sample median. Similarly, I also
group industries into those that are contract intensive and those
that are not; the median level of contract intensity zi
rs1 is used to
divide the two groups.
9 I ﬁrst consider data on production, which
9. The results are similar if zi
rs2 is used to group the industries.
TABLE I
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACT,S KILL, AND CAPITAL INTENSITIES
Contract intensity
zi
rs1 zi
rs2
Contract intensity: zi
rs2 .65*
Skill intensity: hi .44* .28*
Capital intensity: ki .49* .38*
Correlation coefﬁcients are reported. * indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
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THE TWENTY LEAST AND TWENTY MOST CONTRACT INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES
Least contract intensive: lowest zi
rs1 Most contract intensive: highest zi
rs1
zi
rs1 Industry description zi
rs1 Industry description
.024 Poultry processing .810 Photographic & photocopying
equip. manuf.
.024 Flour milling .819 Air & gas compressor manuf.
.036 Petroleum reﬁneries .822 Analytical laboratory instr.
manuf.
.036 Wet corn milling .824 Other engine equipment
manuf.
.053 Aluminum sheet, plate &
foil manuf.
.826 Other electronic component
manuf.
.058 Primary aluminum
production
.831 Packaging machinery manuf.
.087 Nitrogenous fertilizer
manufacturing
.840 Book publishers
.099 Rice milling .851 Breweries
.111 Prim. nonferrous metal,
excl. copper & alum.
.854 Musical instrument
manufacturing
.132 Tobacco stemming &
redrying
.872 Aircraft engine & engine
parts manuf.
.144 Other oilseed processing .873 Electricity & signal testing
instr. manuf.
.171 Oil gas extraction .880 Telephone apparatus
manufacturing
.173 Coffee & tea
manufacturing
.888 Search, detection, & navig.
instr. manuf.
.180 Fiber, yarn, & thread mills .891 Broadcast & wireless comm.
equip. manuf.
.184 Synthetic dye & pigment
manufacturing
.893 Aircraft manufacturing
.190 Synthetic rubber
manufacturing
.901 Other computer peripheral
equip. manuf.
.195 Plastics material & resin
manuf.
.904 Audio & video equipment
manuf.
.196 Phosphatic fertilizer
manufacturing
.956 Electronic computer
manufacturing
.200 Ferroalloy & related
products manuf.
.977 Heavy duty truck
manufacturing
.200 Frozen food manufacturing .980 Automobile & light truck
manuf.
The contract intensity measures reported are rounded from seven digits to three digits.
578 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSare from UNIDO [2003]. I ﬁnd that for good judiciary countries 56
percent of production is in contract intensive industries, while for
poor judiciary countries only 42 percent of production is in con-
tract intensive industries. The ﬁndings are similar if exports are
examined. For good judiciary countries 63 percent of exports are
in contract intensive industries, while for poor judiciary countries
only 40 percent of exports are in contract intensive industries.
A second way to examine the data is to check whether coun-
tries with good contract enforcement have a higher average con-
tract intensity of production and exports. The average contract
intensity of country c is calculated as Z 
c  ¥i 	iczic, where 	ic is
industry i’s share of either total production or exports in country
c. The results of this procedure are summarized in Table III. The
ﬁrst two columns report the estimated relationship between ju-
dicial quality and the average contract intensity of output using
both measures of contract intensity. The third and fourth col-
umns report the same regressions using the average contract
intensity of exports. The results show that even in the raw data
one observes that countries with better contract enforcement
specialize in goods for which relationship-speciﬁc investments are
most important.
IV.B. Estimation Results
I now turn to my estimating equation. Because production data
are only available for 28 aggregate industries and for only 78 coun-
tries, I only use exports as my measure of specialization. OLS esti-
mates of (1) are reported in Table IV. The ﬁrst column estimates (1)
with only the judicial quality interaction included. In this speciﬁca-
TABLE III
JUDICIAL QUALITY AND THE AVERAGE CONTRACT INTENSITY OF PRODUCTION
AND OF EXPORTS
Output regressions Export regressions
Z 
c
rs1 Z 
c
rs2 Z 
c
rs1 Z 
c
rs2
Judicial quality: Qc .392**
(.109)
.465**
(.109)
.290**
(.081)
.291**
(.065)
Number of obs. 78 78 146 146
R
2 .15 .22 .08 .08
The dependent variables are the average contract intensity of production or exports. Standardized beta
coefﬁcients are reported, with robust standard errors in brackets. ** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 percent
level.
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580 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStion, data are available for 146 countries and 222 industries, and,
therefore, the number of possible observations is 146 
 222 
32,412. However, because of 1,396 missing observations and 8,418
zero observations, the number of observations in the regression is
22,598. The estimated coefﬁcient for the judicial quality interaction
ziQc is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, a result that supports
the hypothesis that contract enforcement is important for compar-
ative advantage.
Next, I control for factor endowments as determinants of
comparative advantage. Because factor endowment data are only
available for 70 countries and factor intensity data are only
available for 182 manufacturing industries, the maximum num-
ber of observations is 70 
 182  12,740. However, because of
missing export data and zero exports, the actual number of ob-
servations in the regression is 10,976. In column (2), I ﬁrst re-
estimate the speciﬁcation of column (1) using the smaller sample
of countries and industries. The judicial quality interaction re-
mains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Next, in column (3), I
include the factor endowment interaction variables. The judicial
quality interaction remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Because I report standardized beta coefﬁcients, one can directly
compare the relative magnitudes of the judicial quality interac-
tion with the factor endowment interactions. According to the
estimates, the effect that judicial quality has on the pattern of
trade is greater than the combined effects of both capital and
skilled labor. A one standard deviation increase in the judicial
quality interaction increases the dependent variable by .33 stan-
dard deviations, while a simultaneous one standard deviation
increase in the capital and skilled labor interactions increases the
dependent variable by .19 standard deviations.
10
I also control for other determinants of trade ﬂows that, if
omitted, may bias the estimated importance of contract enforce-
ment for comparative advantage. I interact a number of industry
characteristics with log income per capita to control for the pos-
sibility that, for reasons unrelated to contract enforcement, high
10. One may be concerned that the importance of judicial quality relative to
skill and capital endowments is a result of my estimated skill and capital coefﬁ-
cients being unusually low. However, the estimated magnitudes of these coefﬁ-
cients are similar to what other studies have found. For example, Levchenko
[2004] estimates a speciﬁcation similar to my baseline equation with skill and
capital factor endowment interactions included (see column (2) of Table II). The
beta coefﬁcients for his skill and capital interactions are .10 and .12, which are
similar to the estimates of .09 and .11 here.
581 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEincome countries specialize production in certain industries. I
include interactions of log income per capita with measures of the
share of value added in shipments for each industry, the amount
of intra-industry trade in each industry and the TFP growth in
the previous twenty years in each industry. These interactions
control for the possibility that high income countries have a
comparative advantage in lucrative high value-added industries,
industries with a high degree of fragmentation of the production
process, or industries that are dynamic with rapid technological
progress. I also control for the potential importance of ﬁnancial
development by including an interaction of the log of each coun-
try’s private bank credit to GDP ratio with each industry’s capital
intensity.
11 The last control variable that I include is an interac-
tion of log income with one minus the Herﬁndahl index of input
concentration for each industry, which is a measure that is in-
creasing in the variety of inputs used in production. It is used by
Clague [1991a,b] to measure how “self contained” an industry is.
He argues that because developing countries have poorly devel-
oped transportation, communication, and distribution infrastruc-
tures, they will specialize in production that is “self contained.”
Blanchard and Kremer [1997] and Levchenko [2004] use the
variable to measure a good’s “complexity,” arguing that because
complex goods rely more heavily on institutions than simple
goods, high income countries, with superior institutions, should
specialize in complex goods.
The results with the set of control interactions, without and
with factor endowment interactions, are reported in columns (4)
and (5). The judicial quality interaction remains positive and
statistically signiﬁcant when these alternative determinants of
specialization are controlled for.
12
The estimated relationship between judicial quality and com-
parative advantage, in addition to being statistically signiﬁcant,
is also economically meaningful. For example, if we take the
estimates from Table IV as causal (I consider causality in detail
in Section V), then according to the estimate from column (1), if
Thailand improved its contract enforcement to equal Taiwan’s,
11. See Beck [2003], Svaleryd and Vlachos [2005], and Manova [2005] for
evidence on the importance of ﬁnancial development for comparative advantage.
12. Although not reported here, the results are similar if the control variables
are included in the regression one at a time or in different combinations. As well,
the results are nearly identical if value added, intra-industry trade, TFP growth,
and one minus the Herﬁndahl index are interacted with judicial quality rather
than log income per capita.
582 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthen its exports of “electronic computer manufacturing” would
increase from 2.83 to 6.97 billion U.S. dollars per year. Thailand’s
share of world production in these goods would increase from 1.6
to 4.0 percent.
13
This being said, the proportion of the pattern of trade ex-
plained by contract enforcement is not so large that it is unrea-
sonable. Applying the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell Theorem [Davidson
and MacKinnon 1993, pp. 19–24], one can calculate the propor-
tion of the variation in trade ﬂows unexplained by the country
and industry ﬁxed effects that is explained by the judicial quality
interaction. According to the estimates of column (1), the judicial
quality interaction explains 2.28 percent of the residual variation.
Similarly, according to the estimates of column (3), the judicial
quality and factor endowment interactions together explain 3.09
percent.
14 These results suggest that the majority of the world’s
pattern of trade remains to be explained.
IV.C. Extensions and Additional Results
The results presented to this point have not considered the
possibility that vertical integration may be used to help reduce
under-investment. If vertical integration can be used to increase
relationship-speciﬁc investments when contracts are not per-
fectly enforced, then one should observe that contract enforce-
ment is less important for comparative advantage within indus-
tries for which vertical integration is relatively easy. To test for
this, I use the number of inputs used in the production process as
a measure of the difﬁculty of vertical integration. If there are
ﬁxed costs in the production of inputs, then the additional cost of
producing all inputs in-house will be increasing in the number of
inputs needed for production. Using the 1997 U.S. I-O Use Table,
13. This is calculated as follows. Thailand’s Qc is .580 and Taiwan’s is .734.
Electronic computer manufacturing’s zi is .956. Thailand’s initial value of exports
in the industry is 2,830,776, measured in thousands of U. S. dollars. The beta
coefﬁcient of .289 for 1 corresponds to a coefﬁcient of 5.53. If Thailand improved
its rule of law to equal Taiwan’s, then its exports of electronic computer manu-
facturing (call this x ic) would be given by, ln x ic  ln 2,830,776  1ziQc  ln
2,830,776  6.12  .956  (.734  .580). Solving yields x ic  6,969,627 or 6.97
billion U.S. dollars. Because total world production of electronic computer man-
ufacturing is 176 billion U.S. dollars, this represents an increase of Thailand’s
share of global exports from 1.6 to 4.0 percent.
14. In practice, these ﬁgures are calculated by regressing the dependent and
independent variables on the industry and country ﬁxed effects to obtain the
residuals, which are then used in the regression equation. The R
2 from the
equations gives the variation in trade ﬂows unexplained by the ﬁxed effects that
are explained by the independent variables.
583 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEI construct an indicator variable Ii
nin  that equals one if the
number of inputs used in industry i is greater than the median
number of inputs used in all industries. I interact the indicator
variable with ziQc and include this in my estimating equation.
The results are reported in the ﬁrst column of Table V.
15 Both
interaction terms are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The
positive coefﬁcient for ziQc shows that even within industries for
which vertical integration is most feasible, the estimated rela-
tionship between contract enforcement and trade is still positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. The positive coefﬁcient for ziQcIi
nin 
shows that contract enforcement has an even larger effect on
comparative advantage within industries for which vertical inte-
gration is a less feasible option. According to the estimates, the
effect of contract enforcement on comparative advantage is al-
most twice as large in industries for which vertical integration is
less feasible (with a beta coefﬁcient of .35) relative to industries
for which vertical integration is more feasible (with a beta
coefﬁcient of .19).
In columns (2)–(5), I test whether other country characteris-
tics, rather than judicial quality, cause countries to specialize in
contract intensive industries. I do this by allowing zi to interact
with the country characteristics from Table IV. The alternative
interactions all enter with positive coefﬁcients, a result that is not
surprising given the strong correlation between Qc and the other
country characteristics.
16 Despite this, the estimated coefﬁcient
for the judicial quality interaction remains positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. As well, the coefﬁcients remain approximately
the same magnitudes, ranging from .18 to .32.
IV.D. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
I now test the sensitivity and robustness of my baseline
estimates. I ﬁrst consider the robustness of my results to alter-
native measures of Qc and zi. I re-estimate (1) using four alter-
native measures of the contracting environment and both mea-
sures of contract intensity, zi
rs1 and zi
rs2. The results are reported
in the top half of Table VI. Each entry of the table reports the
15. I report the results for the speciﬁcation without control variables and the
larger sample size. The results are similar with the full set of control variables
included.
16. The correlation coefﬁcients between judicial quality and income, ﬁnancial
development, skilled labor endowment and capital endowment are .83, .76, .68,
.73, respectively.
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585 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEestimated coefﬁcient and standard error for the interaction term
ziQc when different measures of Qc and zi are used. Columns (1)
and (2) report estimates without factor endowment interactions,
while columns (3) and (4) include factor endowment interactions.
Each row uses a different measure of contract enforcement. In the
ﬁrst row I use a measure of legal quality from Gwartney and
Lawson [2003]. The next three rows use measures of judicial
quality and contract enforcement from the World Bank’s [2004]
Doing Business Database. The World Bank has constructed
three measures of the efﬁciency of the judicial system in the
collection of an overdue debt: the number of procedures involved,
the ofﬁcial costs, and the total time required. I scale each variable
TABLE VI
ROBUSTNESS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Without factor
endowment controls
With factor endowment
controls
zi
rs1 zi
rs2 zi
rs1 zi
rs2
Using alternative
measures of Qc:
Legal quality .360**
(.016)
.446**
(.025)
.370**
(.025)
.358**
(.037)
19,072 19,072 10,824 10,824
Number of
procedures
.179**
(.015)
.231**
(.025)
.244**
(.024)
.261**
(.039)
18,873 18,873 10,288 10,288
Ofﬁcial costs .294**
(.020)
.466**
(.031)
.250**
(.031)
.353**
(.046)
18,873 18,873 10,288 10,288
Time .191**
(.021)
.213**
(.030)
.160**
(.027)
.161**
(.040)
18,873 18,873 10,288 10,288
Using “rule of law” to
measure Qc:
Outliers omitted .264**
(.011)
.432**
(.018)
.327**
(.019)
.428**
(.028)
21,409 21,389 10,378 10,379
OECD countries .481**
(.069)
.343**
(.087)
.518**
(.081)
.223*
(.103)
4,941 4,941 3,906 3,906
Non-OECD
countries
.232**
(.018)
.389**
(.029)
.251**
(.032)
.348**
(.049)
17,657 17,657 7,070 7,070
Using 1963 data .441**
(.042)
.536**
(.069)
.288**
(.049)
.290**
(.086)
5,997 5,997 5,322 5,322
The regressions are estimates of (1). The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry i by
country c to all other countries, ln xic. Each entry of the table reports the estimated beta coefﬁcients for ziQc,
with robust standard errors reported in brackets. Below this the number of observations in the regression is
reported. * and ** indicate signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1 percent levels.
586 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSso that a higher number indicates a better judicial system. As
the results show, no matter which measures of Qc and zi are
used, the estimated coefﬁcient of ziQc is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.
The bottom half of Table VI reports the sensitivity of my
baseline estimates to the removal of inﬂuential observations and
to alternative samples. The ﬁrst row reports estimates after re-
moving observations with studentized residuals greater than
2.0.
17 Next, I restrict the sample to only include countries that
joined the OECD by the 1990s. This serves as a check of whether
the results are being driven by broad differences between devel-
oping and developed countries or whether the importance of con-
tract enforcement can also be seen among the group of most
developed countries. In addition, because data from these coun-
tries are of good quality, I am also testing the sensitivity of my
results to the omission of countries with lower quality data. The
next row reports results when the sample is restricted to only
non-OECD countries. The ﬁnal row reports estimates using data
from 1963.
18 The trade data are from the UN’s Comtrade data-
base. Contract enforcement is measured using a measure of legal
quality in 1970 from Gwartney and Lawson [2003]. The contract
intensity measures are constructed using the 1963 U.S. I-O Use
Table and Rauch’s [1999] data. The 1963 sample includes 42
countries and 178 industries. As shown, the results remain ro-
bust to all of these sensitivity checks. Even with the removal of
inﬂuential observations, changes in the sample of countries and
changes in the time period, contract enforcement continues to be
an important determinant of comparative advantage.
V. ENDOGENEITY
As discussed in Section II, one must be cautious in interpret-
ing the OLS estimates as causal. This is because causality may
also run from trade ﬂows to judicial quality. Countries that spe-
cialize in contract intensive industries may have a greater incen-
17. An observation’s studentized residual is calculated from a regression with
the observation in question excluded. This methodology allows one to recognize an
outlier that strongly inﬂuences the estimated regression line, causing the obser-
vation to have a small residual. See Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch [1980].
18. I choose to report 1963 estimates because this is the earliest year for
which data are available. I have also estimated the equations using data from
1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. The results are also robust to the use of
each of these alternative samples.
587 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEtive to develop and maintain a good contracting environment. To
estimate the causal inﬂuence of judicial quality on trade ﬂows I
estimate (1) using IVs. I use differences in countries’ legal origins
as instruments for judicial quality. Although a country’s legal
origin can be used to isolate variation in countries’ legal quality
unaffected by trade ﬂows in 1997, legal origin may also affect
comparative advantage through channels other than contract
enforcement. In other words, it may not satisfy the exclusion
restrictions necessary in order for the instruments to be valid.
Because of this, I pursue a second strategy. I compare the relative
exports of British common law and French civil law countries but
restrict my comparison to pairs of countries that are matched by
important country characteristics that may be affected by legal
origin and also affect comparative advantage.
V.A. Instrumental Variables
To isolate the causal impact of contract enforcement on com-
parative advantage I rely on countries’ legal origins. I use legal
origin indicator variables to construct interaction variables that
are used as instruments for ziQc. The interactions are ziBc, ziFc,
ziGc, ziSc, where Bc, Fc, Gc, and Sc are indicator variables that
equal one if country c has a legal origin that is British common
law, French civil law, German civil law, and Socialist. The omit-
ted category is for Scandinavian civil law countries. Because each
country’s legal origin is predetermined and unaffected by trade
ﬂows in 1997, this can be used to isolate exogenous variation in
judicial quality. Djankov et al. [2003], Acemoglu and Johnson
[2004], and Lerner and Schoar [2005] have shown that legal
origin is an important determinant of differences in judicial qual-
ity and contract enforcement between countries.
The IV estimates are reported in Table VII. The ﬁrst two
columns report OLS and IV estimates of (1) without factor en-
dowment controls. According to the ﬁrst stage estimates, after
German and Scandinavian legal origin countries, British common
law countries have the best rule of law, followed by French civil
law countries and then Socialist countries. Overall, these esti-
mates are consistent with previous evidence of the relationship
between legal origins and judicial quality [e.g., La Porta et al.
1999; Djankov et al. 2003]. The second stage estimates are sum-
marized in the top panel of the table. The IV coefﬁcient is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, providing support for the importance
of contract for comparative advantage. However, the magnitude
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589 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEof the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. Given the
nature of the potential reverse causality, the IV estimates are
expected to be smaller than the OLS estimates, not larger. This
fact, as well as the results from the tests of the overidentifying
restrictions, suggest that the instruments may be correlated with
the second stage residuals, resulting in a violation of the exclu-
sion restrictions. Previous empirical work also supports this pos-
sibility. La Porta et al. [1997, 1998] ﬁnd that a country’s legal
origin also affects investor protection and ﬁnancial development.
If these, in turn, affect trade through channels that have not been
properly controlled for in the estimating equations, the IV esti-
mates will be inconsistent.
I attempt to control for these alternative channels by includ-
ing, in the second stage, the factor endowment interactions, as
well as the full set of interaction control variables from Table IV.
The results, reported in columns (3)–(6) show that including these
control variables does not result in estimates that appear more
valid. The IV estimates are still larger than the OLS estimates,
and they actually increase signiﬁcantly rather than decrease.
This suggests that the set of interactions may not properly control
for the alternative channels through which legal origin may affect
comparative advantage. The most likely reason for this is the
difﬁculty in identifying exactly how country-level variables affect
comparative advantage. To control for the effect that country
characteristics have on the pattern of trade, I must correctly
identify the corresponding industry characteristics that are rele-
vant for specialization. Because of the difﬁculty involved in this,
in the following section I pursue an alternative strategy that does
not require that I identify these industry variables.
V.B. The Use of Propensity Scores
I continue to use differences in legal origin as a source of
variation in judicial quality unaffected by trade ﬂows in 1997, but
I restrict my analysis to only British common law and French civil
law countries. As well, instead of using legal origin as an instru-
ment for judicial quality, I directly estimate the following reduced
form equation
(2) ln
xib
xif  bf  zi  εibf
where xib and xif denote total exports in industry i from a British
590 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScommon law country and a French civil law country. Because, all
else equal, British common law countries tend to have better legal
systems than French civil law countries,  is expected to be
positive. That is, relative to French civil law countries, British
common law countries are expected to export relatively more in
contract intensive industries.
19
I estimate (2) using a sample of all possible British–French
country pairs. The results are reported in the ﬁrst column of
Table VIII. The column reports the estimate of , as well as its
standard error adjusted for clustering at the industry level. As
shown, the estimated coefﬁcient is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant, indicating that compared to French civil law countries,
British common law countries tend to export more in contract
intensive industries.
20,21
British common law and French civil law countries may be
different in ways other than in the quality of their judicial sys-
tems, and these differences may be important for comparative
advantage, causing the estimates of column (1) to be biased. To
overcome this potential problem I restrict my comparison to Brit-
ish and French country pairs with similar characteristics that
may bias my estimates if not accounted for. I match countries
based on per capita income, ﬁnancial development, factor endow-
ments, and trade openness.
22 By restricting my sample to
matched country pairs, I remove the bias that may exist in my
estimates if the country characteristics are ignored. The advan-
19. The functional form of this estimating equation is similar to traditional
tests of Ricardian productivity differences as a source of comparative advantage.
Tests of this nature have their origins with MacDougall [1951], Stern [1962], and
Balassa [1963], and have most recently been performed by Golub and Hsieh
[2000].
20. This result is also apparent in the raw data. Deﬁning contract intensive
industries as those above the median level, one observes that for British common
law countries 64 percent of exports are in contract intensive industries, while for
French civil law countries only 53 percent of exports are contract intensive. This
is also observed in the production data. For British common law countries 54
percent of production is in contract intensive industries, while for French civil law
countries only 48 percent of production is contract intensive.
21. The estimated coefﬁcient of 1.17 is similar in magnitude to the effect of
.90 implied by the IV estimate from column (1) of Table VII. This ﬁgure is
calculated by ﬁrst calculating the estimated difference in British–French judicial
qualities Qb  Qf from the difference in their legal origins: (.295zi) 
(.405zi)  .11zi. Because the second stage coefﬁcient for the judicial quality
interaction is 8.14 (which corresponds to the beta coefﬁcient of .385), the esti-
mated impact of the difference in legal origin on the export ratio ln (xib/xif)i s
8.14  .11zi  .90zi.
22. Trade openness is measured as the log of the ratio of exports plus imports
to GDP. The measures of income, ﬁnancial development, and factor endowments
are the same as used above.
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592 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICStage of matching is that I do not need to identify the relevant
industry characteristics when controlling for country character-
istics. That is, I do not need to know exactly how it is that each
country characteristic affects the pattern of trade.
To match British common law and French civil law countries,
I use propensity score matching [Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983,
1984]. This is done as follows. Let Lc be an indicator variable that
equals one if country c’s legal origin is British common law and
zero if country c’s legal origin is French civil law. I ﬁrst estimate
the following probit model,
Pc  PrLc  1Xc  X c,
where  is the normal CDF and X c is the vector of variables
used to match countries. I calculate each country’s predicted
propensity score P ˆ
c. Then for each British common law country b,
I choose the French civil law country f that minimizes the dis-
tance between their propensity scores. More precisely, for each b,
the matched f satisﬁes
fb  arg min
f
P ˆ
b  P ˆ
f  f  F,
where F denotes the set of French common law countries. This
matching procedure is often referred to as nearest neighbor
matching.
Columns (2)–(6) of Table VIII report estimates of (2) using
the samples of matched country pairs. In columns (2) and (3)
country pairs are matched by log per capita GDP and ﬁnancial
development. In both cases, the estimated coefﬁcients are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, and their magnitudes are less than
half the baseline estimate of 1.17 from column (1). This suggests
that not controlling for differences in income and ﬁnancial devel-
opment between British and French legal origin countries biases
upwards the estimated effect of judicial quality on trade ﬂows. In
addition, the results also show that even when controlling for
these differences, legal origin continues to be an important de-
terminant of comparative advantage. In columns (4) and (5) coun-
tries are matched by factor endowments and trade openness. In
both cases the estimated coefﬁcient remains positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Unlike the results when countries are matched
by income and ﬁnancial development, here the estimated coefﬁ-
cients are about the same or larger than the estimate of column
(1). In the ﬁnal column, I match country pairs using all the
593 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEvariables. Again, the coefﬁcient is positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant. As well, the estimated coefﬁcient is smaller than the
baseline estimate reported in column (1).
Unlike the IV estimates, the propensity score matching esti-
mates tend to decrease when country characteristics are con-
trolled for. For this reason, the matching estimates may be more
reliable than the IV estimates, where the coefﬁcients increase,
rather than decrease, when additional variables are controlled
for. Overall, the matching estimates provide further evidence
that contract enforcement and relationship-speciﬁc investments
are important determinants of comparative advantage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
I have tested whether a country’s contracting environment is
a source of comparative advantage. I found that countries with
good contract enforcement specialize in industries where rela-
tionship-speciﬁc investments are most important. According to
the estimates, contract enforcement explains more of the global
pattern of trade than countries’ endowments of physical capital
and skilled labor combined. To correct for the potential endoge-
neity of judicial quality, I exploited differences in countries’ legal
origins, using both IV and propensity score matching techniques.
Both estimates supported the OLS results, providing added evi-
dence for the notion that a nation’s ability to enforce contracts is
an important determinant of comparative advantage.
VI.A. Data Description
Data on total exports by country c in industry i to all other
countries in the world are from the World Trade Flows Database
[Feenstra 2000]. The data are from 1997 and are measured in
thousands of U. S. dollars. The data are originally classiﬁed by
the 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. I map the data to the BEA’s 1997
I-O classiﬁcation system, using the SITC to HS10 concordance
from Feenstra [1996] and the concordance from HS10 to the I-O
system, which is available from the BEA. I use the number of
HS10 categories linking each SITC and I-O category as an indi-
cator of which I-O category to choose when an SITC category
maps into multiple I-O categories. When an SITC category maps
equally into two or more I-O categories, then the choice of I-O
category was made manually. This mapping methodology results
in each SITC category being mapped into only one I-O category.
594 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSBecause of this, for some I-O categories there are no SITC cate-
gories that map into them. This occurs if only small proportions of
many different SITC categories map into an I-O category. In the
end, the SITC trade data are mapped into 222 I-O categories. An
alternative strategy is to use weights so that trade data in an
SITC category are split between all of the I-O categories linked to
the SITC category rather than just to the dominant I-O category.
The results of the paper are similar if this methodology is used.
The former method is chosen because it results in a more aggre-
gate and, as a result, more conservative and clean, ﬁnal classiﬁ-
cation of the trade data.
Trade data from 1963 are from the UN’s Comtrade database.
The original data are classiﬁed by the 4-digit SITC Rev. 1 system.
I concord the trade data to BEA’s 1963 I-O classiﬁcation using a
concordance from SITC Rev. 1 to SIC72, which the I-O system is
based on. The concordance is from Feenstra [1996].
Production data are from UNIDO [2003]. Production is mea-
sured as the value of output in 1997 in each 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2
industry.
Factor endowment data are from Antweiler and Treﬂer
[2002]. A country’s stock of physical capital Kc is measured by the
natural log of the average capital stock per worker. The stock of
human capital Hc is measured by the natural log of the ratio of
workers that completed high school to those that did not complete
high school. The measures used are from 1992 because this is the
year closest to 1997 for which data are available.
The measures of judicial quality and contract enforcement
are from a variety of sources. The “rule of law” Qc is from Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2003]. The variable, using data
collected in 1997 and 1998, measures the extent to which agents
have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society. These include
perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and pre-
dictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.
The original variable ranges from 2.5 to 2.5, with a higher
number indicating a better rule of law. I transform the variable so
that it ranges from 0 to 1 by adding 2.5 to the original value and
dividing by 5. “Legal quality” is from Gwartney and Lawson
[2003]. It is an index from 1 to 10 that measures the “legal
structure and the security of property rights” in each country in
1995. Data on the “number of procedures,” “ofﬁcial costs,” and
“time” required to collect an overdue debt are from World Bank
[2004]. “Number of procedures” is the total number of procedures
595 RELATIONSHIP-SPECIFICITY, CONTRACTS, AND TRADEmandated by law or court regulation that demand interaction
between the parties or between them and the judge or court
ofﬁcer. Because more procedures are associated with a lower
judicial quality, I use 60 minus the total number of procedures as
my measure so that a higher number indicates less procedures
and a more efﬁcient judicial system. The ﬁnal variable ranges
from 2 to 49. “Ofﬁcial costs” is the sum of attorney fees and court
fees during the litigation process, divided by the country’s income
per capita. As my measure of judicial quality I use 6 minus the
natural log of ofﬁcial costs so that a higher number indicates
lower costs of litigation and a better legal system. The ﬁnal
variable ranges from .45 to 4.56. “Time” is the total estimated
time of the full legal procedure in calendar days. I use 1,500
minus the total time so that a higher number indicates a shorter
duration and a better legal system. The ﬁnal variable ranges from
41 to 1,473.
Real per capita GDP data are from the Penn World Tables
(PWT), with missing observations ﬁlled in using data from Mad-
dison [2001]. I match the Maddison data and the PWT data using
the following OLS estimate of the relationship between the two
measures: rgdpch1997  288.12  1.146maddison1997. The
number of observations in the regression is 100, the R
2 is .98, and
the t-statistics for 0 and 1 are 1.66 and 64.13.
Data on each country’s legal origin are from La Porta et al.
[1999]. Countries are classiﬁed as either German, Scandinavian,
British, French, or Socialist. Financial development CRc is the
natural log of credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to
the private sector as a share of GDP in 1997. The measure is from
Beck, Demirgu ¨c ¸-Kunt, and Levine [1999]. Trade openness is the
natural log of the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
Data are from Feenstra [2000] and the PWT.
Contract intensity zi measures the proportion of an indus-
try’s inputs, weighted by value, that require relationship-speciﬁc
investments in their production. I use data from Rauch [1999] to
identify inputs that are relationship-speciﬁc. The construction of
this measure is described in Section III. When constructing the
measures of zi at the 3-digit ISIC Rev. 2 level of disaggregation,
I use the same procedure as described in Section III, except that
the ﬁnal goods are aggregated to the 3-digit ISIC level. A concor-
dance from the I-O classiﬁcation to 3-digit ISIC was constructed
using the I-O classiﬁcation to HS10 concordance from the BEA,
the HS10 to 5-digit SITC concordance from Feenstra [1996], and
596 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSthe concordance from 5-digit SITC to 3-digit ISIC, which is from
the OECD and available from Jon Haveman’s collection of indus-
try concordances.
Data on factor intensities of production across industries are
from Bartelsman and Gray [1996]. Capital intensity ki is the total
real capital stock in industry i divided by value added in industry
i in the United States in 1996. Skill intensity hi is the ratio of
nonproduction worker wages to total wages in industry i in the
United States in 1996. The original data are classiﬁed according
to the SIC87 system. A mapping between the two is constructed
using the SIC87 to HS10 concordance and the HS10 to I-O clas-
siﬁcation concordance, which are both from the BEA.
Value added vai is measured by total value added divided by
the total value of shipments in industry i in the United States in
1996. TFP growth tfpi is the average growth rate in TFP in the
United States between 1976 and 1996 in industry i. Both mea-
sures are from Bartelsman and Gray [1996]. Intra-industry trade
iiti is the amount of intra-industry trade in each industry. I use
the Grubel-Lloyd index for the United States in 1997. The index
is equal to 1  (xi  mi/(xi  mi)), where xi and mi are exports
and imports in industry i. The trade data are from Feenstra
[1996]. One minus the Herﬁndahl index of input concentration
(1  hii) is constructed using the 1997 United States I-O Use
Table. Industry i’s Herﬁndahl index is ¥j ij
2, where ij is the
share of input j used in the production of ﬁnal good i.
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